OBSERVATOIRE DE L'EPARGNE EUROPÉENNE

Comportements des Investisseurs pendant la crise financière

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Investor behaviour in the post-global financial crisis era

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A brief history of investor behaviour

What started as a US-led sub-prime crisis in August 2007 quickly metamorphosed into a global financial crisis, in the process shattering people's long and firmly held beliefs that the world's financial systems, and the banking sector in particular, were inherently safe and stable. The impact of the global financial crisis on investor behaviour was dramatic and unprecedented. A flight to safety and safe haven products such as money market funds and cash and deposit products was inevitable, but the most worrying aspect was the collapse of the fixed income sector. These were staple products that had been highly popular with continental investors, their simplicity something with which they were comfortable and they understood. Equity funds experienced a similar collapse in support, but there was a clear historical link to distribution practices that have led to the loss of generations of investors.

Fig 1



Analysis of the asset growth of European mutual funds over the years, points to a more extreme picture of the European asset industry. Figure 2 below charts asset growth split into its two main components of sales and market performance. In 2008, market performance was clearly the major contributory factor in the contraction of the European asset base, with equity funds responsible for the bulk of the decline in performance. And unlike the post-dotcom era, when sales were positive despite negative performance, in 2008 both components of asset growth were negative.

Fig 2



Looking at the historical trends and the equity story more closely gives us clues about today's investor behaviour. Until the mid nineties, most of today's investors were still savers and those that had made the transition were invested in the traditional bond and money market funds of their respective markets. However, stock markets began to take off boosted by the internet bubble and banks embarked on a major conversion of their savers into (more profitable) investors. Critically, momentum in fund activity only really started to build when the market was close to its peak, and it culminated in bull market inflows of c€500bn in just two years.

Fig 3



Investments and portfolios were decimated in the subsequent crash, but the equity asset class did not suffer major redemptions, and in fact equity flows continued. There were two reasons for this: investors who had invested prior to 2001 had nothing left to lose, and so sat it out in the hope that their investments would eventually break even, while investors who had invested after 2001 were taking advantage of the cheaper valuations. Nevertheless, it was not until 2003/2004 when stock markets were clearly in the ascendancy that equity flows began to gain real momentum.

The first sign of trouble came mid 2006 with the first of a series of Chinese stock market corrections at a time when stock markets were fast approaching their previous millennium highs. For many investors, this was the sign that stock markets were once again peaking, and more importantly, were unlikely to break their previous highs. In short, the Chinese correction was seen as the precursor to a major correction. The net effect was a year of two halves: while the first half of the year had been home to buoyant flows, the second half of 2006 was characterised by limp flows that lagged stock market indices. A couple of further China market corrections simply re-confirmed the negative stance that investors had taken. Given the fact that by 2006/2007, most if not all European stock markets had returned and surpassed their previous highs, it was a clear case of profit-taking by investors who had had their fingers burned in the previous crash.

The global financial crisis

Despite a jittery start to the year, most European stock markets were in positive territory between March and May 2007. The stock market environment had settled down and investors were once again being lulled into a false sense of security. So when the sub-prime crisis finally hit, it left retail and institutional investors reeling. Since then, the sub-prime crisis has set off a chain of events that has resulted in the worst financial crisis since the general depression of the thirties.

Mutual fund activity and investor choices do not exist in a vacuum. They are affected by actual and anticipated changes in economic variables. In keeping with other segments of the global economy, the mutual fund industry has been battered during the current economic downturn, and what has made investment decisions more difficult is the fact that the current business cycle is atypical. Usually, policy stimulus leads to growing demand, which inevitably eats into the economy's capacity to produce goods and services. Prices rise to ration scarce resources and interest rates rise as monetary policy is tightened to reduce demand pressures and to control inflation. Since monetary policy is an imprecise tool, more often than not, the tightening leads to a fall in demand, an inventory correction and a decline in GDP.

But it was different this time. We are all familiar with the roots of the continuing financial crisis, which has affected the liquidity of the global banking system and the solvency of its largest financial institutions. In spite of the slashing of interest rates and an explosion in monetary reserves, the world economy remains starved of credit, whether it is for mortgages, consumer finance, small business lending or trade finance. Output has fallen at rates not seen since the 1930s.

Consumers and investors have been affected by the visible and all-too-real aspects of the downturn: the potential loss of jobs, declines in the value of property, plunging asset values on pensions and other investments, and in some instances, the collapse of their banks. Also at work were equally real but less tangible blows to confidence. Investors have been bombarded by a succession of horror stories — the likelihood of depression and deflation, economic statistics that were frequently 'the worst statistics since data has been collected', well-known and long-established financial institutions going to the wall and needing rescue via forced mergers and/or government subsidy and takeover, and policy-makers scrambling to construct myriad and unprecedented rescue packages to stabilise the rot.

Impact of crisis on asset management industry

It has not been an hospitable investment environment, particularly for mutual funds. Fund managers are the all-too-visible face of the financial services industry, and despite their non-involvement in the collapse of global financial systems, they have suffered disproportionately from the backlash. As markets tumbled, fund sales collapsed and suffered huge levels of redemptions, while asset values were relentlessly eroded by freefalling stock markets. Over the course of 2008, total European mutual fund assets fell 26%. Bond, mixed asset and equity fund assets fell 21%, 30% and 48% respectively, a pattern consistent with the underlying risk of each asset class. Only money market funds increased as assets rose 28% over the period, a volume that was eventually reduced as investors redeemed to switch funds into the safe haven of guaranteed deposits of local banks.

As well as the general rise and fall of flows in response to the crisis and the resulting market conditions, other changes have been noted in the sales mix since August 2007. The three main changes can be summarised as follows:

- **Absence of retail investors**. The biggest change to the sales mix in the past two years has been the loss of retail and even high-net-worth support for mutual funds. Economic concerns have resulted in retail investors focusing on reducing their liabilities or simply putting money aside for a rainy day — usually in an ordinary deposit account — and this has been actively encouraged by the bank-led distribution model of continental Europe. Protecting their capital has become the most important factor in their saving and investment decisions and government guarantees on deposits have aided their decision. The high-net-worth client segment has also been absent, and but once confidence in this sector is restored, flows are expected to start recovering fairly quickly.

- **Flight to safety.** The flight to safety has been dramatic with money market flows accounting for the bulk of activity. Apart from the rabid re-allocations and mass withdrawals at various points in the cycle when stock markets dipped or rose suddenly, most activity has been generated by the safe end of the investment spectrum, for example in the money market or bond arena.

- **Bank cannibalisation of client holdings**. The most critical aspect of the changing sales mix has been bank influence and the cannibalisation of their clients' holdings. To understand this, we need to take a few steps back in time. We have already discussed the way banks had led the charge in the nineties when they converted their unprofitable savers into profitable investors. At that time, the bulk of the activity was directed to in-house asset managers.

  But following the bursting of the millennium bubble, they became distributors and product packagers to stem the potential loss of investors unhappy with fund performance and demanding access to third-party fund managers. Guided architecture soon became the accepted orthodoxy in fund distribution, allowing banks to control client access and develop fruitful partnerships with third-party suppliers. The process accelerated with flows peaking in the 2005 and 2006 period.

  Banks have again been influential in the direction of clients' investments in the global financial crisis era. Banks' response to the global financial crisis came in two phases. First was a cannibalisation of clients' domestic holdings into bank deposits and other financial products that supported balance-sheets. As a result, domestic funds were recording net redemptions in 2007 but foreign funds were still in positive territory. But given the prolonged nature of the crisis, the banks then embarked on a cannibalisation of their guided architecture holdings, directly affecting foreign fund managers.

The bond conundrum

The most worrying aspect of the above issues has been the complete evaporation of support for bond funds. For the bond category, the issues are more much more complex. An analysis of asset growth in the bond category split between the two main component of sales and performance demonstrates that the monumental outflows by mainstream investors from fixed income funds had very little to do with performance (see figure 4).

Of course bonds come with a variety of risks, but in most continental European markets the bulk of fund activity is in local Government bonds or core global currency bonds, which are generally regarded as relatively safe income-generating vehicles. These two sectors posted positive performance year on year even in 2007 and 2008, but the fixed income category as a whole suffered a mass exodus which in just two short years has resulted in outflows of €245bn.

To explain the reasons behind this unprecedented level of withdrawals from bond funds, a trend that has not been experienced by Asia or the US necessitates a look beyond the pure performance factor and at the markets that have contributed the most to the losses. Figure 5 shows the flows into fixed income products split by market for 2008. The markets that have been the most prolific in terms of outflow were Italy and Spain; two markets where proprietary products dominate and where product cannibalisation has been most evident. Essentially, the bond story had little to do with the competence of asset managers and product quality, but was a mass migration of mainstream clients, orchestrated by the banks, out of mutual funds and into cash deposits or structured products — products that suited the needs of the bank distributor and helped prop up their weakened balance-sheets.

Fig 4



Distribution is therefore a significant factor in investor behaviour. Among European markets where the fund distribution model is dominated by banks, fund activity has been slow to return and competing products such as deposits have been gaining significant ground.

Fig 5



Domestic versus foreign funds[1]

Although many market commentators point to August 2007 and the sub-prime crisis as the catalyst for the industry's problems, in reality the problems had begun more than a year earlier. This was a time when stock markets were nearing their previous highs and investors were readying themselves for a quick escape. Figure 6 below shows that a number of domestic markets registered net redemptions in 2006, particularly Italy, Switzerland, Greece and Spain. However, foreign funds registered positive flows across the board, recording their highest sales volumes in the markets suffering the heaviest domestic redemptions.

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[1] Source: Lipper FMI. Actual cross-border data from SalesWatch online, a confidential cross-border benchmarking service with 39 members.

Fig 6



The breadth and depth of the crisis has gradually changed the fortunes of domestic and foreign fund managers alike. Figure 7 below plots sales flows in 2008. Here, only a few markets are positive for domestic activity, but none of them is positive for foreign activity. As the global financial crisis has unfolded, with additional horror stories at every turn, retail and HNW have withdrawn from funds.

Although the process may have started with jittery investors themselves, banks subsequently played a central role in the direction of mutual fund sales these past two years. Retail investors were the first to be moved back into deposits, but as the crisis played out and the potential for a fast recovery receded quickly, banks began to convert guided architecture holdings. This had a direct impact on foreign fund managers.

Fig 7



2008 was therefore a difficult year for foreign providers, but SalesWatch online data for the first four months of 2009 points to increased appetite for foreign funds, with most European and Asian markets back in positive territory for net flows. Activity remains a fraction of previous highs, however and will not really reignite until wealth management and private banking support begins to consolidate and gather pace.

Passive versus active management

The long running active versus passive debate continues. Active managers believe that they can generate alpha consistently over time, but for many asset classes, the data has suggested otherwise. Historically, retail investors generally failed to hear this message mainly because of the key advantage passive funds have over active, costs. With low or no front-end fees and low annual management fees, passive funds are ignored by the bank and financial adviser distribution channels, which dominate many mutual fund markets.

These channels generally help themselves to the front-end fee (which can range to as high as 5% of the investment) and a share (typically 50-65%) of the annual management fee. So the cards were stacked against the proponents of passive management. The exception was the US where direct fund sales to the public are more common and where groups, namely Vanguard, could preach the benefits of passive investing in the financial sections of the weekend newspapers.

In late April, S&P released its latest *S&P Indices Versus Active Funds (SPIVA) Scorecard* report, covering the five-year period ending December 2008. Some of its key findings include:

- Over the five-year market cycle from 2004 to 2008, the S&P 500 outperformed 71.9% of actively managed large cap funds, the S&P MidCap 400 outperformed 79.1% of mid cap funds and the S&P SmallCap 600 outperformed 85.5% of small cap funds. These results are similar to that of the previous five-year cycle from 1999 to 2003, but there was a significant deterioration in active manager performance in the second five-year period for both large and small cap stocks. The latter result dispels the myth that active managers can out perform in less efficient markets ie small cap stocks.

- The equity fund data shows that there was significant 'style drift' over the most recent five-year period. In other words, unlike passive funds, you don't necessarily get what you paid for.

- Benchmark indices outperformed a majority of actively managed fixed income funds in all categories over a five-year horizon. Five-year benchmark shortfalls range from 2-3% per annum for municipal bond funds to 1-5% per annum for investment grade bond funds. Moreover, outside of High Yield and Emerging Market Debt funds, the indices outperformed between 90% and 100% of active managers.

- The belief that bear markets favour active management is a myth. A majority of active funds in eight of the nine US domestic equity style boxes were outperformed by indices in the negative markets of 2008. The bear market of 2000 to 2002 showed similar outcomes.

- The script was similar for non-U.S. equity funds, with indices outperforming a majority of actively managed non-U.S. equity funds. Over the five year period, 63% of Global Funds and 84% of International Funds underperformed the respective indices. Moreover, 59% of International Small Cap Funds and 90% of Emerging Market (Composite) Funds under performed the respective indices, again casting doubt on the argument that active management does better in less efficient markets.

Certainly, sales of passively managed funds, particularly ETFs, have risen sharply since the sub-prime crisis broke, but this is likely to be a short-term change or reaction to the conditions, rather than a structural, long-term change in investor and distributor behaviour. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, because ETFs are traded like stocks and shares, they are highly liquid and allow investors to hold positions for less than a day, something that is not possible with active funds and in an extremely volatile market, this is a key feature. Figures 8 and 9 below highlight

some interesting aspects to passive sales flows. Figure 8 illustrates that passive management has always been a small but consistent component of sales flows these past few years. However, in the early years passive management was mainly of the index-tracking variety, in later years it has been gradually overtaken by ETFs.



Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, ETFs have been used extensively to short indices and markets. This usually involves borrowing the stock (or in this case the ETFs), and selling it immediately. Once the price has dropped to the expected level, the stock is bought back and returned to the original owner. If the market has behaved as the investor predicted, these transactions create profit for the investor. The net and distorting effect of such transactions is that ETFs can generate flows whether stock markets were rising or falling.

One important aspect is that beyond the HNW and institutional segments, ETF activity has remained very underdeveloped. As discussed earlier, retail investors are unlikely to be offered ETFs and similar products for the simple reason that distributors earn their revenues through front-end fees and a share of the annual management charge. Since ETFs do not pay trail fees, they are unlikely to be offered unless the distributor can include some other mechanism or charge with which to replace the lost revenues. Packaging ETFs is one such solution and there have been some signs of ETFs being used in packaged products and funds of funds, but these were exceptional rather than the norm.

Distribution channels that operate on a discretionary basis and therefore can charge a portfolio management fee or an advice fee are more likely to make the switch to passive investments. But in the bank-driven distribution model of Continental Europe, a switch to a predominantly ETF-based investment model is still some years away. Given its IFA-dominated distribution model the UK is perhaps the one exception to this rule, but a move towards a passive investment model still seems several years away, despite Vanguard's recent high-profile entry to the UK market to take advantage of the changes expected in the Retail Distribution Review.

The Financial Services Authority (FSA) conducted a Retail Distribution Review (RDR). One of its key objectives is to ban commissions entirely and have IFAs operating on an advice-fee basis by 2012. Such a move would fundamentally change UK revenue models, but it is not a clear-cut conclusion that ETFs would be the sole beneficiaries. Though they would undoubtedly attract more attention from IFAs, active fund managers would be able to fight back by offering institutional-type

pricing on their funds. The large minimum investments expected are easily overcome since most IFAs operate through platforms which aggregate flows; the only necessity would be for platforms themselves to change their revenue models since they too take a share of the annual management fee.

Prospects for the near future

A debate has commenced over whether the worst is behind us. Perhaps it is, but before a sustainable economic recovery is in place, the global economy must still overcome a number of significant hurdles. These include the recapitalisation of the financial system, the continued de-leveraging of consumer balance sheets (which will depress demand), and the fact that continental European banks are not out of the woods yet with regard to the write-downs and write-offs of toxic debt and the low level of reserving against loan losses in what is likely to be an anaemic recovery. Economic and markets are likely to remain volatile, acting as a depressant on investor confidence.

Recovery is unlikely to come quickly. Current economic forecasters had been offering a cautious return to economic growth in mid-2009, but those forecasts have since been revised to 2010 and even further away. However, there will be a lag before positive economic news begins to influence long-term savings through mutual funds.

Lipper FMI forecasts assume that after the 2008 losses, asset growth will be flat in 2009 with any market performance gains being offset by further redemptions. Lipper FMI predicts sales flows of €80m-€90m in 2009, although much of this still will still be into conservative options such as money market funds. A more sustained recovery could then develop in 2010 but this will be dependent on a number of factors, not least the willingness of banks to promote funds to their clients.

At the start of 2008, Lipper FMI forecasts for Europe set a compound annual growth rate for the next five year period of 8.8%, down from the then current rate of ~12%. In the light of recent events this expectation has been revised down to 5.6%, which assumes flat to negative growth in 2009, picking up to ~ 2% in 2010. The exact numbers are almost impossible to determine with any degree of accuracy, but unless there is some regulatory intervention to encourage mutual fund savings, the asset management community would be wise to plan for a flat trading period for the next two years. Some of the drivers of recovery would include:

- The solvency of the banking industry removing the need to pull long-term, but unprofitable, assets on to bank balance-sheets. This may take longer than expected because the current recessionary influences could encourage people to withdraw short-term savings to support life-style spend. Data available on savings growth suggests that whilst money is switching from long-term options to deposits, the amount of new money going into the savings pot is quite restricted[2].
- A declining inflation rate, which will make bank deposits that offer a return of ~1%-2%, less than compelling. This driver may be offset by the real threat of deflation and a Japanese-style outcome in which bank savings expanded at the expense of other more dynamic options.
- Wealth sector demand, which will inevitably be in the vanguard of recovery. With hedge funds and a number of previously popular alternatives now seriously compromised, discretionary advisers will be the first to spot potential value in rising fund sectors. Markets that support a robust private banking and wealth management sector are therefore likely to see a faster return to norm.
- The development of packaged options that offer some levels of protection either through diversification or guarantee. The packages will vary in each market but they will be important

[2] Savings data to end of Q1, 2008 from the Central Banks of five major markets show savings growth rate.

because they allow the bank and insurance assemblers the opportunity to maximise fee-earning potential. Note, though, that there will be a conservative influence in product construction coming in part from regulator pressure and in part from the new Government shareholders. Those banks that drew on Government funding could be relegated to a pure save-and-lend banking role.

Negative influences

- Distributor focus on structured notes and other non-fund products that have less transparency but are potentially more profitable. The fact that many investors have suffered losses on their fund holdings will encourage distributors to promote products that are new or untarnished. Structured notes with assets held by third-party custodians are an option already on offer in Germany.
- Greater regulatory focus on funds investing in securities perceived to be riskier. This could make Ucits III funds less attractive or, at least, harder to register. There are already signals from the Hong Kong regulators that Ucits III funds may not be acceptable if they use derivatives other than for the purposes of efficient portfolio management.
- Some short-term loss of distribution opportunities. Those banks that have suffered the biggest liquidity problems and have benefited from Government funding are likely to operate a more conservative business model where product sales, third party or otherwise, are restricted. Those banks that operate a guided-architecture distribution platform may restrict the number of preferred partners that they will deal with in order to reduce administration costs.

Product issues

The trends in distribution are likely to take a back to basics approach which will favour the more traditional core sectors. Innovation is more likely to occur at the packaging level rather than at the fund level.

Product consolidation will be a feature of the next two to three years, particularly if the fund merger provisions of Ucits IV are fully implemented. There are around 12,000 funds in Europe with less than €20bn in assets. We could see a quarter to a third of these funds merged or closed.

A deluge of Government bonds is expected to be issued next year in order finance the 2008 rescue packages. Commentators anticipate that this will result in yields rising and this could revive investor interest in the fixed income sector as bank interest rates fall. A revival of fixed income appetite would be an important stimulus to industries in Italy, Germany, Austria and other markets which have traditionally had a strong demand for bonds.

At the niche level, fiscal stimulus packages in many developed and emerging markets are likely to benefit funds investing in infrastructure and countries where infrastructure represents an important part of GDP.

An environment of low to no interest rates will present demand for a different style of product. As in Japan, pressure on the savings of retirees could result in a growth of monthly pay-out funds. In Japan these funds tend to take the form of open architecture funds of funds. The Japanese example also offers the potential of some kind of carry trade business or a growth of interest in strengthening currencies.

Longer-term changes

There is a high degree of certainty that the wealth advice segment will not only return but will be the first comers. Non-existent or negligible interest rates are putting pressure on the affluent and on those reliant on income from their savings. The UK has seen a flood of money into corporate investment grade bonds and this trend has also started to take shape in other parts of Europe. Flows into emerging market funds, commodities and infrastructure-type products are building and all are redolent of high net worth movement. Additionally, those groups that are winning this business are the cross-border groups. These are the groups that are most reliant on third-party distribution and therefore have solid relationships with wealth advisers. The data, whilst not definitive, at least offers promise that the wealth community is returning — happy news for some, but is it enough?

The larger client segment (two-thirds of assets) belongs to the less-sophisticated mainstream investor that has, over time, been fed on a diet of government bond funds in the 1990s, proprietary equity funds during the tech bubble period and latterly, absolute return promises and structured notes. With the exception of the UK, these clients are led by bank sales initiatives and their return to funds will therefore be determined by the role that banks either choose, or are forced, to take in the post-financial crisis world.

Low interest rates on large deposit bases are painful for European banks so action will surely be taken to transfer these holdings into more profitable services but whether it means a rush of mainstream money into mutual funds offered on bank platforms remains to be seen. Open architecture did not occur until after the millennium and therefore those sales flows were bank-led mainstream flows. The tech bubble destroyed the bulk of this mainstream momentum and the most recent financial crisis resulted in a further contraction. So the question is will banks pull mainstream investors back into funds when markets recover? The answer is possibly, but it is equally likely that the available pot will be diverted into other capital markets products. The early evidence suggests two potential responses from banks:

1. A tentative step back into guaranteed funds and other mutual fund products in which banks have proprietary strength.
2. A focus on the developing opportunities presented by ETFs and ETNs. Most of Europe's large retail banks have established an ETF range and in a number of cases, this has expanded into the structured note arena. Retrocessions are not available but profitability lies in the trading arena and elsewhere within the bank. There is also the potential to wrap these products into a more complex offering although it is still too early to see any real momentum in this arena.

Lipper FMI's reading of the data is that, with the exception of guaranteed activity and some funds of funds, new business from mainstream investors really came to a halt after the dot com bubble. Those that were in, stayed in until they could escape without loss and this contributed to some of the frighteningly large redemptions last year. Furthermore, the introduction of guided architecture, whilst opening the door to some large sales for cross-border groups, did not really deliver much access to mainstream investors other than via more complex packaged products. The fear is that the guided architecture door is also closing; that the number of preferred partners on each platform will contract and that the pressure for profits will favour a new range of proprietary products.

This means that the pace of industry growth will be considerably slower in the coming years than in the late 1990s. And the pressure will definitely be on the fettered domestic groups. Unless they are able to adapt to the new world they will see their assets continue to shrink. Each country will be different but the overall impact will be contraction.

Interestingly, we believe that most cross-border groups will be relatively unaffected or rather their recovery is more likely to be directly correlated with market recovery. The following retail market options can be assumed for cross-border business:

1. Ongoing activity in funds of funds. In a good year (2006) this was worth €21bn of net new money to third party vendors[3]. We have yet to see any green shoots of recovery in this sector but it's fair to assume that the potential still exists;
2. Insurance and unit-linking. We believe that this sector accounts for around 12% of total fund assets. In the good years (2005 and 2006) it therefore produces around €30bn a year of new business, most of which was accessible to third party vendors. This is a sector that could see further expansion in the recovery phase; insurance groups have access to clients and the ability to structure solutions-style products. My concern here is with regulation and the likelihood that insurance products will be swept up within the Substitute Products regulations. Increased transparency may temporarily slow down or halt their development.
3. Private banking/advised clients, including UK IFA activity – in the good years, worth €110bn or so[4].
4. And what of bank platform business — at its peak in 2005 it accounted for about €25-€30bn of third-party net sales, assuming that around 20% was given over to third party products across the whole of Europe[5]. Within this number there will be some overlap with funds of funds activity so the pure bank channel sales could be even smaller once they are netted out over a year.

The bottom line is that the core business for cross-border groups will probably return as the market environment becomes more benevolent. The green shoots of this activity have already started to appear. But, if the mutual fund industry is ever to develop critical mass, it needs to look beyond the converted audience and try to secure access to a larger part of the enormous (€6trn) pool of savings. This will require the support of governments in incentivising long-term savings, regulatory focus on the conflicts of interest that pervade distribution structures and last, but not least, a willingness amongst asset managers to support distribution channels that offer independent advice to their clients.

End

[3] Assuming that 40% of net flows into 3rd party funds of funds actually come from proprietary sources.
[4] Assuming that 80% are available to third-party groups
[5] Based on a survey of distributors conducted by FERI FMI on behalf of Credit Suisse in 2006